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PROCEDURE FOR PUPILS: 
WHAT CONSTITUTES DUE PROCESS IN A 
UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY HEARING? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a student in a public university, college, or 
graduate school;1 you’ve likely spent thousands, if not tens of thousands, of 
dollars in pursuit of your education.2  You have also invested many years in 
college.  You know that your future happiness, income, and quality of life 
are contingent upon your personal and academic reputation in that setting as 
well as earning your degree.3  One day, you are called into the dean’s office 
or, perhaps, some other university official’s office.  You are informed that 
you have been accused of committing an act that warrants a disciplinary 
hearing to determine whether you will receive a significant suspension or 
even expulsion.4 
 
1. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1961) (identifying the 
differences between public and private universities with respect to the applicability of constitu-
tional due process claims alleging due process deprivations).  The Dixon court noted one may 
have a constitutional due process claim against a public university but not against a private univer-
sity because the court found that there was a “well-settled rule that the relations between a student 
and a private university are a matter of contract.”  Id. at 157. 
2. See COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION SERIES: TRENDS IN COLLEGE 
PRICING 5 (2005), http://collegeboard.com/press/releases/48884.html (follow “Trends in College 
Pricing 2005 (.pdf1/MB)” hyperlink) (“Average published tuition and fees in 2005-06 are $5,491 
at public four-year colleges and universities . . . and $21,235 at private nonprofit four-year col-
leges and universities.”).  On average, over the last decade, the tuition and fees at public univer-
sities have risen at the rate of 6.9 percent per year or 4.4 percent per year after inflation.  Id. at 10. 
3. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157-58.  The Dixon court stated that no argument was required 
to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society.  Without 
sufficient education the plaintiffs [the students facing expulsion] would not be able to 
earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as 
possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens. 
Id. at 157.  See also Walter Saurack, Note, Protecting the Student: A Critique of the Procedural 
Protection Afforded to American and English Students in University Disciplinary Hearings, 21 
J.C. & U.L 785, 785-86 (1995) (providing that students involved in disciplinary hearings, when 
compared to those who are not, may be rejected in admissions to other universities, receive lower 
pay upon earning a degree and gaining employment, and suffer serious emotional distress). 
4. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975) (explaining that procedural due process 
measures become a greater concern in university disciplinary hearings when there is the potential 
for a significant suspension or expulsion); see generally Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (stating that there is a need for more stringent procedural protections where the accused 
student faces severe punishment).  See also Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (N.D. 
Me. 2002) (reaffirming the proposition that more extended suspensions and expulsions, perhaps a 
period of ten days or more, invoke more stringent due process protections, but that shorter 
suspensions, those under ten days, still invoke some amount of due process protection). 
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You have no idea what to expect in a university disciplinary hearing, 
but at the same time, you are fully aware of the fact that your reputation and 
future rest upon the outcome of this hearing.5  You probably have many 
questions about your upcoming hearing.  How much time do I have to 
prepare for my hearing?6  What am I being accused of?7  What kind of 
evidence is there against me?8  Can I call a lawyer to represent or assist me 
at the hearing?9  What can I say on my own behalf?10  Can I question the 
witnesses who will speak against me at the hearing?11  Who will decide 
whether I actually performed the alleged bad act?12  How much does the 
university have to prove to suspend or expel me?13  With the growing 
importance of education in our society and the great number of students 
who attend public universities, colleges, or graduate schools, these legal 
questions are important to the individual student, the courts, and society at 
large.14 
 
5. See Saurack, supra note 3, at 821.  Although university students may be literate and 
educated adults, they are often “inexperienced” in understanding and applying even basic proce-
dural rules that govern disciplinary hearings.  Id.  The lack of experience, coupled with emotions 
such as fear and anger, creates an “inability to articulate their stor[ies],” and, therefore, students 
find it difficult to wage an adequate defense.  Id. 
6. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 661 (11th Cir. 1987) (describing the 
controversy and ambiguity that exist with respect to the amount of time that the university or 
college must provide to the student in preparation for a disciplinary hearing). 
7. See, e.g., id. at 662 (providing the basic content that must be present in the notice of the 
disciplinary hearing to the student).  The content, at a minimum, should explain the accusation or 
charge against the student.  Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. 
8. See, e.g., Ctr. for Participant Educ. v. Marshall, 337 F. Supp. 126, 136 (N.D. Fla. 1972) 
(explaining the proposition that a student should be afforded some information concerning the 
names of the witnesses who will testify and a summary of the testimony each will present). 
9. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 100-07 (1st Cir. 1978) (analyzing when, 
if ever, a student in a college or university hearing should be afforded the right to an attorney). 
10. See, e.g., Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (standing for the 
proposition that fairness in a disciplinary hearing requires a student be afforded the opportunity to 
speak on his own behalf). 
11. See, e.g., id. (finding that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was 
instrumental in achieving fairness in a university disciplinary hearing). 
12. See, e.g., Nash, 812 F.2d at 665 (stating that sufficient process would also require an 
impartial fact finder to determine the guilt of the student at the university disciplinary hearing).  
While there is no legal disagreement that an impartial fact finder is necessary for due process, 
controversy frequently arises over who may serve as that impartial fact finder.  See, e.g., Saurack, 
supra note 3, at 817 (arguing that “[w]hen a university melds together the roles of prosecutor, 
enforcer, and adjudicator, the functions of each role no longer check one another.”). 
13. See, e.g., Keene, 316 F. Supp. at 221 (discussing the requirement that a student be 
suspended or expelled only “on the basis of substantial evidence” presented during the 
disciplinary hearing).  As discussed in the limitations on scope, see infra note 18, this note will not 
examine the quantum of evidence (e.g., probable cause, preponderance, clear and convincing, or 
beyond a reasonable doubt) required to achieve due process in a university disciplinary hearing. 
14. See Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 241, 251 (N.D. Me. 2000) (standing for the 
proposition that education is of monumental importance to both the individual student, society, 
and the government).  See also NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., 
Historical Summary of Faculty, Students, Degrees, and Finances in Degree-Granting Institutions: 
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The purpose of this note is to examine the state of existing due process 
law in public universities, colleges, and graduate institutions.  This note al-
so discusses the procedures that public universities must provide to students 
during the course of a disciplinary hearing in order to achieve fundamental 
fairness or due process.  Part II discusses the development of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process law in university settings.15  Parts III through VII 
discuss the application of that law and what procedures, if any, universities 
should or must provide to students who face these hearings under certain 
factual circumstances.16  Part VIII of this note will present several personal 
conclusions about the state of due process law in university disciplinary 
hearings. 
This note will be limited to discussion and examination of only 
procedural due process issues17 that may arise in this setting.18  Substantive 
 
Selected Years, 1869-70 through 2003-04, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/d97/d97t171.asp (last 
visited May 22, 2006) (providing, among other information, the staggering increase in number of 
post-secondary institutions from 1869 to 2004).  In 1869, there were only 563 post-secondary 
institutions in existence in the United States.  Id.  By 2004, the number of institutions skyrocketed 
to 4,236.  Id.  In the 1869-70 academic year, only 9,371 students earned bachelor’s degrees.  Id.  
By the 2003-04 academic year, 1,399,542 students earned bachelor’s degrees.  Id.  These increases 
evidence the growing importance of post-secondary education in America. 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
16. See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 636-37 (6th Cir. 2005) (providing 
that the Due Process Clause “sets only the floor or lowest level of procedures acceptable” but also 
admitting the university’s rules were “far from ideal and certainly could have been better”).  In 
essence, what a university should ideally provide to students faced with disciplinary hearings is 
not necessarily what it must provide according to the Constitution.  Id. 
17. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (explaining that procedural due 
process, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, refers to the right to 
fundamentally fair procedures before the government can deprive a citizen of a liberty or property 
interest).  A life, liberty, or property interest must be implicated to invoke the due process protec-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment; liberty and property interests are implicated in disciplinary 
hearings that threaten to suspend or expel a student at a post-secondary institution.  See, e.g., 
Saurack, supra note 3, at 786-88 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975)) (providing 
that property and liberty interests are implicated in public university disciplinary proceedings). 
18. Although not discussed in this note, “substantial” evidence in support of guilt and guilt 
warranting punishment are often regarded as fundamental procedural requirements in university 
disciplinary hearings.  Keene, 316 F. Supp. at 221.  See generally Nicholas T. Long, The Standard 
of Proof in Student Disciplinary Cases, 12 J.C. & U.L. 71 (1985) (arguing that the “substantial” 
evidence requirement in these hearings should actually become a clear and convincing standard of 
evidence before suspensions or expulsions can occur).  Also not discussed, but generally found to 
be essential to achieving procedural due process in these settings, is the requirement that findings 
of the tribunal be made in writing.  Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967).  See 
also Charles A. Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1071-72  (1969) 
(arguing that written findings with respect to evidence of guilt or innocence are due process 
requirements).  But see Flaim, 418 F.3d at 636 (citing Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. 
Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984)) (“It is always wise to produce some sort of record of the 
proceedings, . . . though a record may not always be constitutionally required.”). 
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due process claims will not be addressed.19  This note will not discuss 
sufficient process with respect to private universities.20  There will be little 
or no discussion of the specific claims that a student may allege or possible 
remedies that she may be afforded in bringing claims of procedural due 
process violations against her state university.  This note also disregards 
other related issues such as immunity and official or individual liability for 
due process deprivations when these claims arise. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS LAW IN 
UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY SETTINGS 
A. THE STATE UNIVERSITY MEETS THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
The right to due process arises under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.21  “The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the 
State[s] to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.”22  Essentially, procedural due process23 requires that the 
party who is subject to the potential deprivation of a life, liberty, or property 
interest be afforded a fair and meaningful opportunity to tell his or her side 
of the story before the State takes away that protected interest.24 
Classifying the state university as the “State” was one of the first 
hurdles the courts had to face in determining whether a student could 
effectively allege a constitutional due process violation against a state 
university.25  A university is clearly not a “State” within the plain meaning 
 
19. See, e.g., Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.3d 3, 6 (1991) (explaining that substantive due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment refers to the right of citizens to be free from govern-
mental deprivation of a right regardless of how fair the procedures for such a deprivation may be). 
20. See discussion  infra note 25 (explaining that private universities, at least those classed as 
private actors, would likely not be subject to the procedural constraints imposed on public or state 
actor universities). 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The relevant portion of this Amendment reads: “No State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  Id.  The right 
to procedural due process is also guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  However, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural 
due process restricts the federal government and its actors, and is, therefore, not particularly 
relevant for the purposes of constitutional due process guarantees with respect to state universities.  
Id. 
22. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975). 
23. See supra notes 17 and 19 (distinguishing procedural due process from substantive due 
process). 
24. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (explaining that procedural due 
process requires an opportunity to speak on one’s own behalf at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful way). 
25. See Carol J. Perkins, Sylvester v. Texas Southern University: An Exception to the Rule of 
Judicial Deference to Academic Decisions, 25 J.C. & U.L. 399, 404-06 (1998) (discussing the 
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of the word.26  To transform the state university into the State itself, and 
thereby invoke at least minimal Fourteenth Amendment protections, the 
United States Supreme Court explained that there must be “a sufficiently 
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated 
entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State 
itself.”27  That is to say, the university can be held to have violated the 
constitutionally guaranteed due process rights of the student only if the 
university can be classed as a “state actor” by showing that “the State was 
sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct [on the part of the 
university] as state action.”28 
The actor (i.e., university) in question can be classified and treated as 
the State by a showing that either the State created the framework 
governing the conduct of the actor,29 the State delegated its authority to the 
actor,30 or the State knowingly accepted the benefits derived from the 
unconstitutional behavior.31  Because the State often benefits from its state 
universities, by way of a university’s prestige or ability to create increased 
economic activity within the state, coupled with the fact that the state 
university is state-funded, the courts seem to have little or no trouble 
reaching the conclusion that state universities can be fairly treated as state 
actors.32  The state actor doctrine effectively allows the courts to transform 
the state university into the State itself, and therefore subject the state 
university to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 
 
state actor doctrine which, under certain conditions, allows the courts to treat both public and, at 
times, private universities as the state itself, and therefore, subject those institutions to the 
restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n  v. Tarkanian, 
488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment protects only against 
injurious actions taken by the State or state actors, and that private actors are not constrained by 
the due process requirements inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004). 
27. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192 n.12 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 
(1974)). 
28. Id. at 192; see also Perkins, supra note 25, at 404-06 (discussing generally the 
development and application of the state actor doctrine). 
29. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192 (citing N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 
(1975)). 
30. Id. at 192 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)). 
31. Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)). 
32. See, e.g., id. (stating that “[a] state university without question is a state actor”); Donohue 
v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 142 (N.D.N.Y 1997) (finding that there was no issue as to whether the 
state university in this case was a state actor). 
33. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 190 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 
(1982)) (explaining that private entities can be treated as states for the purpose of implicating the 
Fourteenth Amendment so long as the requirements of the state actor doctrine are met). 
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B. DIFFERENT KIND OF STATE ACTOR 
1. The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis 
If it is clear that a “state university is without question a state actor,”34 
why have courts historically been reluctant to weigh in on the procedures 
employed by universities to discipline students and the outcomes they 
reach?35  Why have the courts decided that the full-scale procedural due 
process requirements characteristic of criminal or civil trials are unneces-
sary in serious university disciplinary settings?36  The reasons likely include 
the history of the educational setting,37 the historical view of the student,38 
and the evolution of the importance of education within society and the 
eyes of the court.39  The university, due in part to its unique history, is 
treated with greater deference than the State itself with respect to the 
protections the university must provide under the Fourteenth Amendment.40 
Arguably, courts of the past were less willing to impose even minimal 
rules that might hamper the wide discretion universities enjoyed in 
conducting and deciding university disciplinary hearings because of the 
applicability of the doctrine of in loco parentis.41  The Latin term in loco 
 
34. Id. at 192. 
35. See, e.g., Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 304 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D. Me. 2004)  
(expressing the concern that judicial intervention in educational disciplinary hearings may not be 
appropriate in all cases, and such intervention should be exercised with care); see also Dunn v. 
Fairfield Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 255, 158 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the court 
had “concern[s] about transforming the federal courts into the appellate arm of the schools 
throughout the country”). 
36. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975)) (explaining that due process in a university setting does not rise 
to the same level as the rights and protections that constitute due process in a civil or criminal 
trial). 
37. See Perkins, supra note 25, at 406-07 (discussing the influence of in loco parentis on the 
history and development of due process in the realm of university disciplinary hearings). 
38. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (explaining the view that even students under the age of eighteen are no 
longer expected to “‘shed their constitutional rights’ at the schoolhouse door”); see also Perkins, 
supra note 25, at 407-09 (discussing the evolution of courts’ view of the legal status of students). 
39. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (discussing the 
importance of education to both the student and society at large). 
40. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 590-94 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).  In the dissent’s 
view, there was a need to defer to a school’s judgment in disciplinary matters.  Id.  According to 
the dissent, schools are responsible for maintaining order to foster the education and well-being of 
all students; to meet this end they use discipline as a learning tool.  Id.  Because of these 
responsibilities and the necessity of using discipline to carry out these responsibilities, schools 
play a role similar to that of parents when deciding the appropriate disciplinary measures.  Id. 
41. See Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (stating “[t]here was 
a time when college administrators and faculties assumed a role in loco parentis.”) (citations 
omitted). See generally Perkins, supra note 25, at 406-07 (explaining the relationship between 
student and university under the doctrine of in loco parentis); KERN ALEXANDER & ERWIN S. 
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parentis literally means “to stand in the place of a parent.”42  While the 
doctrine does not apply directly to the relationship of students and post-
secondary institutions today,43 the great discretion the doctrine afforded 
universities in the past has certainly left some imprint on the courts of 
today.44 
Historically, under the in loco parentis doctrine, colleges and 
universities were perceived to play a role similar to that of parents while the 
students played the role of children.45  A parent would certainly not be 
expected to give her child notice and a hearing before administering punish-
ment in an ordinary parent-child relationship, and in loco parentis operated 
in roughly the same fashion when applied to post-secondary disciplinary 
settings.46  When in loco parentis clearly applied to universities, the univer-
sity, like the parent, was fully responsible for “the physical and moral 
welfare and mental training of the pupils” and, as such, was not required to 
provide notice of hearing nor to employ “fair” procedures during the course 
of that hearing to administer punishment.47  Based on all of the parent-like 
 
SOLOMAN, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW 411 (1972) (explaining that historically “in loco 
parentis has a surprisingly strong legal basis in higher education.”). 
42. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004). 
43. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-40 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding as a matter of 
law that a university did not stand in loco parentis to an eighteen-year-old college student injured 
by another student on campus); Booker, 800 F. Supp. at 238-39 (explaining that “[t]he authori-
tarian role of today’s college administrations has been notably diluted in recent decades” and 
“eighteen year old students are now identified with an expansive bundle of individual and societal 
interests and possess discrete rights not held by college students from decades past”) (citations 
omitted).  See generally Perkins, supra note 25, at 406 (noting the decline of the strict use of in 
loco parentis in the past). 
44. See, e.g., Dixon, 294 F.2d at 160 (Cameron, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about 
judicial rulings that affected university disciplinary procedures).  The dissent declared that the 
majority experienced a “basic failure to understand the nature and mission of schools.”  Id.  
Schools and students, according to the dissent, are subject to a relationship that the majority did 
not grasp in coming to its decision.  Id.  The school has responsibility for “proper discipline” and 
“the morals of the other pupils” at the institution.  Id.  The dissent argued that the Dixon majority 
improperly added “crushing responsibilities” to universities by requiring them to conduct a 
hearing when a student faces significant suspension or expulsion.  Id.  Rather than providing 
hearings in these cases and effectively turning the administrators at the university into a 
“[g]argantuan aggregation of wet nurses and babysitters,” the court should defer to the school’s 
“honest exercise of discretion.”  Id. at 160-61.  In the dissent’s view, the only time the courts 
should interfere or intervene in university disciplinary matters are those “rare” instances where the 
school blatantly fails to use proper or honest discretion.  Id. 
45. Perkins, supra note 25, at 406-07.  See also ALEXANDER & SOLOMON, supra note 41, at 
411 (“This theory places the school in the place of the parent . . . .”). 
46. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-94 (1975) (Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J., 
dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969)) 
(stating that “[s]chool discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of 
training our children,” and that this heavy parent-like responsibility should not be hampered by 
procedural formalities in disciplinary matters that will ultimately diminish the authority of the 
school). 
47. Perkins, supra note 25, at 406. 
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responsibilities that were once possessed by universities, the courts were 
highly reluctant to interfere with the disciplinary procedures and decisions 
universities made with respect to their students.48 
It appears the former use of the doctrine has permanently affected the 
way courts perceive the relationship of the student and the university 
today.49  Universities are still provided great deference in deciding the fates 
of students at university disciplinary hearings.50  The past application of the 
doctrine of in loco parentis has arguably left modern courts with the linger-
ing sense that universities are still charged, at least to some degree, with the 
parent-like responsibilities of teaching mental and moral skills.51 Thus, even 
modern courts are likely to defer to universities to determine the appropriate 
discipline for their students.52 
2. Historical Student Status, Academic Deference, and the 
“Privilege” of Education 
The history of the courts’ perception of the student, in addition to the 
perception of the university itself, may also help to explain the reason uni-
versities are arguably a different kind of state actor.53  Universities, unlike 
other state actors, possess remarkable discretion to decide what process is 
due at their disciplinary hearings.54  The protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in past university disciplinary hearings were often nonexistent 
due to their inapplicability in this setting and, even today, are often minimal 
at best.55 
Until the 1960s, the courts considered underage students, even at 
universities, to be “second class citizens.”56  Before the 1960s, minors were 
 
48. Id. at 406-07. 
49. See, e.g., Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200, 1202-03 (D. Kan. 1971) (stating 
that the courts “should accept any university procedure which is reasonably calculated to be fair to 
the student and lead to a reliable determination of the factual issues involved”). 
50. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (explaining the need for flexibility not only 
because it is part of the very nature of due process itself, but also because the court was reluctant 
to lessen a university’s ability to use these hearings as a “learning tool”). 
51. See, e.g., Gardenhire, 326 F. Supp. at 1201-03 (discussing the responsibilities that 
schools have towards their students). 
52. See id. at 1202 (finding that university rules and regulations should not be struck down 
by the courts under the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment if the rules are 
somewhat reasonable). 
53. See, e.g., Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (explaining 
the historical view that students at colleges were considered minors for many legal purposes until 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s). 
54. Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09. 
55. See Booker, 800 F. Supp. at 238-39 (explaining the legally degraded status of students in 
the past, which afforded them very few rights).  See generally Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09 
(explaining the courts continuing reluctance to weigh in on university disciplinary hearings). 
56. Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09. 
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not perceived as the types of “persons” protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, nor were they fully-realized “persons” for the purposes of 
invoking the protections guaranteed by other constitutional rights.57  
Students on campus were not fully entitled to invoke certain protections 
provided to them in the United States Constitution against state actor 
universities because they were lesser citizens by bearing the brand of 
“student.”58 
Furthermore, because universities were perceived as the experts in 
delivering education, the courts were reluctant to criticize or strike down as 
unconstitutional the rules, regulations, and manner in which universities 
taught or disciplined students within the walls of the university.59  Univer-
sities not only historically possessed roles comparable to the role of a 
parent, but they were also the “experts” regarding student education and 
educational disciplinary measures to foster mental and moral education.60  
The fact that universities were perceived as both parents, under the doctrine 
of in loco parentis, and experts in the realm of education, led courts to the 
logical conclusion that wide discretion should be afforded to universities in 
disciplinary matters.61  The courts of the past were uncomfortable to weigh 
in against the decisions of the university, and the courts perceived their lack 
of expertise in education and educational disciplinary matters as a 
problem.62 
Finally, universities were given greater discretion in the past because 
former courts placed less value on the pursuit and acquisition of education 
with respect to both the individual and society.63  In the past, higher 
education was perceived as a mere unprotected privilege.64  There was little 
recognition of a constitutionally protected right or interest in education, 
and, therefore, the courts of the past did not feel obliged to apply the 
 
57. Id. 
58. See, e.g., Booker, 800 F. Supp. at 238-39 (explaining that even students over the age of 
eighteen were provided fewer legal rights than other adults because of their status as students). 
59. Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09. 
60. Id.; see also Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200, 1202-03 (D. Kan. 1971) (stating 
that “the courts should be careful not to impose upon the university any specific or particular 
procedural framework”). 
61. Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09. 
62. Id. 
63. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (discussing the 
courts’ changing perception of the importance of education to both individuals and society at 
large).  See generally Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09 (explaining the courts’ changing view of 
the importance of education). 
64. Perkins, supra note 25, at 409.  See also ALEXANDER & SOLOMON, supra note 41, at 
411-12 (explaining that past courts viewed education as an unconstitutionally protected privilege 
until the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and found 
education to be a right, at least at the primary and secondary levels of education). 
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protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to university discipli-
nary hearings that threatened to or did deprive students of the “privilege” of 
higher education.65  Thus, the courts of pre-Dixon era were disinclined to 
forcefully weigh into the disciplinary procedures of state universities. 
C. THE LANDMARK CASE: DIXON REQUIRES NOTICE AND A HEARING 
In Dixon v. Alabama Board of Education,66 the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided to look at what was happening behind the walls of 
Alabama State College (ASC).67  In Dixon, six African-American students 
brought suit against ASC68 after they were expelled for participating in a 
civil rights demonstration.69  The students alleged that they were deprived 
due process of law upon expulsion.70  All six of these students were in good 
academic standing at the time of the expulsion,71 and were expelled from 
ASC after the Alabama State Board of Education ordered ASC officials to 
expel the students.72  These six plaintiff-students were not given any notice 
that participation in the civil rights demonstrations would result in suspen-
sion or expulsion, nor were they provided with any type of hearing.73  The 
district court upheld the expulsions, finding that ASC was not required to 
provide the students with notice or hearings before expelling them.74  The 
Fifth Circuit disagreed.75 
The Fifth Circuit came to several important revelations in deciding the 
Dixon case.  First, even if a student’s education was a “privilege” rather 
than a right,76 and attendance at a public university was voluntary rather 
than compelled as was the case in elementary and secondary education,77 
the State could not “condition the granting of even a privilege upon the 
renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process.”78  The 
Fifth Circuit further explained, “The right to notice and a hearing is so fun-
damental to the conduct of our society that the waiver [of the constitutional 
 
65. Id. at 409-15.  66. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
67. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 152. 
68. See id. at 151 n.1 (describing the complaint filed by the students). 
69. Id. at 152 n.3. 
70. Id. at 151 n.1. 
71. Id. at 152 n.3. 
72. Id. at 151-54. 
73. Id. at 154-55 n.4. 
74. Id. at 155. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 156. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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right to fundamental elements of procedural due process] must be clear and 
explicit.”79  In essence, the Dixon court found that notice and a hearing 
were fundamental to achieving due process in a university disciplinary set-
ting, and that students did not waive or renounce their rights to constitu-
tional due process simply because their attendance at the university was 
voluntary or perhaps only a privilege.80  Dixon set the stage for students to 
protect a privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment which had gone 
largely unprotected in the past.81 
The Dixon court also opined that the importance of higher education 
had become “vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society.”82  The court 
noted the importance of education to the individual pursuing it stating that 
“[w]ithout sufficient education the plaintiffs [students] would not be able to 
earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as com-
pletely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens.”83  In 
Dixon, the Fifth Circuit openly suggested that the old notion of education as 
an unprotected “privilege” was outdated and education was actually more of 
a necessity to both the individual and society than past courts acknowl-
edged.84  In this sense, the Dixon court helped to revolutionize the defini-
tion of due process in a university disciplinary hearing.  The Fifth Circuit 
suggested that the pursuit of education was so important that before a 
student could be deprived of such an opportunity, the university would have 
to ensure some level of protection and fairness inherent in the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Finally, the Dixon court showed less deference to the university than 
courts of the past.85  The doctrine of in loco parentis and the past courts’ 
perception of the “expert” university were less binding on the Dixon 
court.86  The Fifth Circuit in Dixon did not completely defer to the decisions 
and procedural system created by the expert university.87  While the court 
did not prescribe precise procedural rules, telling the university what it had 
to do to achieve sufficient process before administering punishment, the 
 
79. Id. at 157. 
80. Id. 
81. See Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (explaining that 
prior to the 1960s, students were provided with very few rights on college campuses). 
82. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Perkins, supra note 25, at 409-15. 
86. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.  The Fifth Circuit in this case chose to consider the importance 
of education to both the individual and society.  Id.  The Dixon court did not pay much attention to 
the old notion that universities were expert, parent-like entities that should be afforded great 
leeway in deciding all disciplinary rules and procedures with respect to their students.  Id. 
87. Id. at 159. 
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Dixon court told the university what it could not do.88  After Dixon, students 
at public universities had at least some comfort in the knowledge that 
universities could not arbitrarily exercise the great power of expulsion.89  
Dixon required students in jeopardy of suspension or expulsion to be 
provided with some notice of the charges and some opportunity to defend 
themselves.90 
D. THE POST-DIXON ERA 
After Dixon, the courts were more inclined to examine, discuss, and 
help shape the finer points of university disciplinary hearings.91  The prog-
eny of Dixon have generally found adequate notice, with respect to both 
timing and content, to be a fundamental element of due process in a univer-
sity disciplinary setting.92  The post-Dixon courts have also discussed, at 
some length, the right to counsel in these settings and have come to 
different conclusions as to whether counsel is essential to achieving 
sufficient process.93  Furthermore, the courts have considered whether due 
process in a university setting requires the right to cross-examine witnesses 
at the hearing.94  The post-Dixon courts have unanimously agreed that an 
impartial fact finder is imperative to achieving fairness in any disciplinary 
 
88. See id. at 157-59 (requiring  universities to employ elementary principles of fair play and 
procedure, such as notice and a hearing, which universities must not deny to students facing 
suspension or expulsion). 
89. Id. at 157. 
90. Id. 
91. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1987) (analyzing a variety of 
alleged due process violations after students were charged with academic dishonesty, rather than 
criminal-like accusations, and faced suspension); Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 100-07 
(1st Cir. 1978) (considering whether procedural due process violations would occur at a university 
hearing in which a student was criminally charged with rape and assault and denied the assistance 
of counsel); Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Me. 1970) (discussing the possibility of  
due process violations and adopting a list of procedural requirements in deciding the 
constitutionality of quasi-military academy disciplinary hearing in which a student was accused of 
possessing marijuana and alcohol in violation of academy’s rules). 
92. See, e.g., Nash, 812 F.2d at 661-63 (discussing notice requirements as to both content 
and timing).  See generally Wright, supra note 18, at 1070-72 (discussing the notion that notice 
and a hearing are fundamental requirements for due process in student disciplinary hearings). 
93. See, e.g., Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (finding that access to 
counsel was a necessary element of due process); Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 277 F. Supp. 
649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (finding counsel necessary to achieve due process in a university 
disciplinary hearing).  But see Nueze v. Castleton State Coll., 335 A.2d 321, 326 (1975) (finding 
that even in the face of pending criminal charges a student was not entitled to an attorney for the 
purposes of due process). 
94. See Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (finding that the right 
to cross-examine witnesses was not necessarily a fundamental aspect of due process in university 
disciplinary hearings).  But see Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir. 1972) (hold-
ing that when the weight of the evidence against the student is subject to serious issues of credibil-
ity, an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses may be a necessary element of due process). 
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hearing,95 but many have also pointed out the inherent difficulty in proving 
that the fact finder lacked impartiality in these settings.96 
The courts have come a long way by deciding that due process applies 
in these higher educational settings and in defining the procedural elements 
that may not be ignored by universities in conducting disciplinary hear-
ings.97  Since Dixon, the courts have clearly displayed concern for the pro-
tection of the students subject to these hearings.  However, because of the 
very flexible nature of procedural due process itself and the balancing test 
that must be performed on an ad hoc basis, there is still much ambiguity in 
discerning when and how certain elements may be necessary to preserve 
due process in university disciplinary hearings.98 
III. NOTICE 
It should be noted from the outset that “[t]here are no hard and fast 
rules by which to measure meaningful notice.”99  Notice with respect to 
time should be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances”100 such 
that the accused student can prepare to defend herself at her upcoming 
hearing.101  As to the content of the notice, there is also no fixed concept;102 
rather, the university must take “rudimentary precautions” to ensure its stu-
dents are informed of the accusations against them.103  Much like the flexi-
bility in timing, the sufficiency of the content of the notice is highly depen-
dent upon the particular circumstances of each disciplinary hearing.104 
 
95. See, e.g., Winnick, 460 F.2d at 548 (finding that an impartial decision maker is absolutely 
essential in achieving due process in these settings). 
96. See, e.g., id. (discussing different ways in which a tribunal may be found to lack 
impartiality). 
97. Compare Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (explaining that the 
“minimum requirements” for due process in university disciplinary hearings include at least four 
elements) with Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158-59 (holding that the minimum requirements of due process 
in a university setting are only notice and a hearing). 
98. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1987).  The Nash court explained 
that once it was determined that due process applied in this setting, the court would have to assess 
each element of the alleged deprivation of due process by considering the following three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such an interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
99. Id. at 661. 
100. Id. (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978)). 
101. Id. at 661-62. 
102. Id. at 662. 
103. Id. (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975)). 
104. Id. at 662. 
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A. TIMING 
In Nash v. Auburn University,105 the Eleventh Circuit discussed the 
sufficiency of the six-day106 period that the accused students were afforded 
to prepare for their disciplinary hearings.107  The students in Nash requested 
a longer time period to prepare their cases and more specific notice of the 
charges at their first hearing.108  The university provided them with two 
extra days.109  However, the university did not deliver notice of the 
rescheduled date to the students until the day before the rescheduled hearing 
was to be held.110  The students argued that one day of notice for their 
rescheduled hearing was insufficient, and therefore, violated their rights to 
procedural due process.111 
In determining whether the timing of the notice was sufficient, the 
Nash court discussed both the one-day notice for the students’ rescheduled 
hearing,112 and the total time that had accrued between the initial notice of 
the disciplinary hearing and the time at which the hearing was actually 
conducted.113  The court discussed a line of cases in other administrative 
settings, which clearly pointed to the conclusion that one day of notice was 
insufficient.114  However, despite this authority, the Eleventh Circuit found 
that the students were afforded due process, at least with respect to timing, 
for two reasons.115  First, the students did not object to the one-day notice 
when they arrived at the rescheduled hearing.116  The students’ failure to 
object to the one day notice at the rescheduled hearing constituted 
acquiescence to the rescheduled hearing and the notice it carried with it.117  
In this regard, even if the notice was insufficient for purposes of due 
 
105. 812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1987). 
106. See Nash, 812 F.2d at 661-62 (stating that the six-day period was calculated to include 
the time from the initial notice to the date that the rescheduled disciplinary hearing was actually 
conducted). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 662.  The initial hearing in which the students requested extra time was held on 
June 10.  Id. 
109. Id.  The disciplinary hearing was originally scheduled for June 10, but based on the 
students’ request for additional time, the university rescheduled the hearing for June 12.  Id. 
110. Id.  The students received notice of the June 12 hearing on June 11.  Id. 
111. Id. at 661-62. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 662. 
114. See id. at 661 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); Walker v. United 
States, 744 F.2d 67, 70 (10th Cir. 1984); Wagner v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. 
Ark. 1974)) (supporting the proposition that one day of notice violated due process with respect to 
timing). 
115. Id. at 661-62. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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process, the students waived their right to argue the insufficiency of the 
timing by appearing at the hearing and failing to object to the alleged 
insufficiency.118 
The Nash court also observed that the students actually ended up with a 
total of six days to prepare their defenses from the time of the initial 
notice.119  The court suggested that the severity of the alleged misconduct120 
and the severity of the punishment that accompanied such an offense121 
should be considered in deciding whether or not the timing was adequate.122  
However, even in light of these circumstances, the court found the timing 
was adequate because it allowed the students to produce witnesses on their 
behalf123 and provide documentation in support of their defense.124  The 
court also discussed the fact that the students did not request additional time 
to prepare at the rescheduled hearing.125 
While Nash indicated that six days was enough time to prepare a 
defense in this case, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that in other cases, 
where the charge and penalty are serious and the student needs more time to 
prepare her defense, additional time may be required.126  While the Nash 
court was not forced to consider whether due process required the univer-
sity to grant several extensions between the initial notice and the actual dis-
ciplinary hearing127 or past the time allotted in its own regulatory code,128 





120. Id. at 662.  The students were accused of serious academic dishonesty.  Id. 
121. Id.  The plaintiffs were in a graduate school of veterinary medicine and faced suspen-
sion if the hearing was not resolved in their favor.  Id. at 663. 




126. Id. at 661. 
127. Id.  The court found that because the students agreed to the rescheduled date, they 
waived the opportunity to argue it was unfair.  Id. at 661-62.  However, a student who does not 
acquiesce to the rescheduled date may perhaps be afforded several continuances if her case 
warrants the extra time.  Id. at 661. 
128. Id.  The issue was not presented in Nash, but the case indicated that the appropriateness 
of timing is contingent on the facts unique to each case, such that a student in need of greater time 
to create a meaningful defense would likely have a fair chance at extending the period for 
preparation well beyond that provided by the university’s rules or regulations.  Id. at 661-62.  In 
Nash, the university’s code required the university to afford a student only three days to prepare, 
but Nash received six.  Id.  The court found six days, rather than three, to be reasonable and fair 
under the circumstances.  Id. 
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In Donohue v. Baker,129 a federal district court reached a conclusion 
similar to that of the Nash court regarding the sufficiency of the timing of 
notice130 given to a student charged with sexual misconduct.131  The ac-
cused student in Donohue was provided with initial notice by phone and 
through his parents.132  The university notified him that he would be called 
into a disciplinary hearing three days later.133  Donohue was provided with 
written notice only one day before the hearing.134  Like the students in 
Nash, the student in Donohue did not object to the time allotted to him by 
the university.135  In fact, in Donohue, the accused student “agreed, if not 
demanded” to hold the hearing on the date scheduled by the university.136  
The Donohue court, like the Nash court, found that the student’s failure to 
object constituted a waiver of his possible due process right to greater 
notice.137 
However, the Donohue court did note that the charge of sexual 
misconduct was a serious, rather than minor, accusation.138  Further, since 
much of the proceeding required the tribunal to assess the credibility of 
witnesses testifying about the sexual assault charge, the student might have 
been entitled to more time to prepare his defense if he had objected to the 
three-day notice period.139  While the court declined to find three days 
insufficient in this case,140 the court did suggest that the severity of the 
charge, coupled with the issues of credibility of the witnesses, would proba-
bly require more time to prepare a meaningful defense than a less serious 
charge with fewer credibility issues.141 
Overall, the timing of notice necessary for due process in a university 
disciplinary hearing is incredibly flexible.142  However, so long as a student 
does not acquiesce to the timing set by the university, the length of time 
required to achieve due process should be determined by circumstances 
particular to the case, including: (1) the severity of the charge against the 
 
129. 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
130. Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 146. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 145. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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student;143 (2) the severity of the potential punishment;144 (3) the time 
required for a student to access witnesses, documentation, or other evidence 
to create a meaningful defense;145 and (4) the nature of the issues or 
evidence that will be heard and presented at the hearing.146 
B. CONTENT 
Much like the flexibility in timing, the content required for sufficient 
notice will vary from case to case based on the unique circumstances 
presented in every hearing.147  “The concept of due process is, of necessity, 
a flexible one.”148  In Nash, the Eleventh Circuit explained that, at a mini-
mum, “rudimentary precautions”149 must be taken to inform the students of 
the “specific charges [against them] and grounds, which if proven, would 
justify expulsion [or significant suspension].”150  The Nash court rejected 
the argument that students must be provided “the substance of the evidence 
to be presented against them,” or that students “were entitled to a summary 
of the testimony expected” of the witnesses against them.151  This type of 
notice would not be required in cases where the students would be present 
at the disciplinary hearing and have the opportunity to confront the 
witnesses against them.152  The courts regularly hold that the content of the 
notice meets the minimum requirements for specificity so long as it 
includes the charge and the grounds upon which the charge rests.153 
 
143. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1987); Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 
145-46. 
144. Nash, 812 F.2d at 662. 
145. Id. 
146. See Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 146 (indicating that where the quality or weight of the 
evidence turns on the credibility of the witnesses involved in the hearing, greater time should be 
allowed for preparation).  This argument might also be extended to situations where there is a 
large quantity of evidence in the case, or perhaps where the evidence is of such complexity that 
neither the accused student nor the tribunal would be able to come to accurate conclusions without 
additional time for preparation.  Id. 
147. Id. at 145 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). 
148. Id. (citing Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Miss. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978)). 
149. Nash, 812 F.2d at 662 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975)). 
150. Id. at 663 (quoting Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961)). 
151. Id. at 662. 
152. Id. at 663. 
153. See, e.g., id. at 662-63 (requiring that the notice provides students with the alleged 
offense or violation); Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158 (requiring that the notice contains both the alleged 
offense and a summary of the evidence that will be used against the student); Gomes v. Univ. of 
Me. Sys., 304 F. Supp. 2d 117, 128 (D. Me. 2004) (requiring that students are provided with 
notice of the charges against them).  See generally Wright, supra note 18, at 1071-72 (discussing 
the importance of notice which provides the student with specific charges and the nature of the 
evidence against him). 
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IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The right to counsel has often been found to be a nonessential element 
with respect to achieving a fundamentally fair university disciplinary hear-
ing.154  However, some courts have explicitly155 or implicitly156 suggested 
an exception to this rule exists in disciplinary cases which involve serious 
accusations of misconduct and when there is or likely will be a criminal 
action taken against the student.157  Further, the role counsel intends to play 
in the hearing may affect the student’s ability to access counsel under the 
above-described circumstances.158  In addition, some courts have consid-
ered the complexity of the university’s procedures and if the university is 
represented by counsel to determine whether the assistance of counsel is 
necessary to satisfy sufficient process.159 
A. THE IMPLICATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN A MAJOR 
DISCIPLINARY HEARING 
As stated above, the right to counsel, at least in most jurisdictions, is 
not deemed to be a procedural “right” essential to achieving due process in 
a university disciplinary hearing.160  The right to counsel, or perhaps the 
lack thereof, is one of the most troubling areas in determining whether a 
student has had a meaningful opportunity to tell her side of the story and 
defend against the accusations.161  A student finds herself in a “Catch 22” 
when she is faced with a serious accusation from a university which carries 
the penalty of significant suspension or expulsion, and, at the same time, 
she is or likely will be facing a serious criminal charge arising out of the 
same series of events.  If she speaks at the university disciplinary hearing 
without the advice of counsel, she puts herself in jeopardy of providing 
 
154. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1978). 
155. Id. at 104-06. 
156. See Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that an 
accused student may be entitled to an attorney for due process at his university disciplinary 
hearing if the attorney will be present to protect the student’s right against self-incrimination 
rather than to sway the outcome of the hearing). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 640 (2005). 
160. See Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 104 (finding that an attorney’s advice and presence at a 
disciplinary hearing is a requirement of due process only when the student has an implicated Fifth 
Amendment right and is facing a pending criminal charge).  But see Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. 
Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (stating that “the student must be permitted the assistance of a 
lawyer, at least in major disciplinary proceedings”).  In this jurisdiction, Keene created what 
appears to be a bright-line rule for the assistance of an attorney in university disciplinary hearings.  
Keene, 319 F. Supp. at 221. 
161. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 104 (discussing whether counsel is necessary to 
preserve due process in a university disciplinary hearing). 
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what may very well be incriminating statements that could be used against 
her in a pending criminal trial.162  However, if she preserves her right to 
silence and refuses to participate in or speak during the course of the uni-
versity disciplinary hearing, she has probably not made a meaningful case 
and may well be suspended or expelled from the university after she fails to 
openly explain or defend herself.163  In either case, without counsel, the 
student lacks the knowledge of an attorney who may be of assistance in 
protecting her against incriminating herself, and at the same time, affording 
her the opportunity to speak on her own behalf and present a meaningful 
defense at the university disciplinary hearing.164 
Much like the hypothetical student above, in Gabrilowitz v. 
Newman,165 Gabrilowitz, a student at the University of Rhode Island (URI), 
was notified by the local police department that he was facing a criminal 
charge of assault with intent to rape a fellow university student.166  Shortly 
thereafter, URI notified Gabrilowitz of its intention to charge him with as-
sault with intent to rape and with an additional assault charge stemming 
from the same incident or series of events that led to his initial criminal 
charge.167 
The notice of the university disciplinary hearing also described the 
procedures and rules the university would employ in conducting the 
hearing.168  These rules and procedures explained, among other things, that 
Gabrilowitz could not be assisted by counsel nor even have counsel present 
at his university disciplinary hearing.169  Gabrilowitz sought an injunction 
barring URI from holding his disciplinary hearing until after his pending 
criminal case was resolved or until such time that he would be afforded 
counsel of his choice to assist him at the disciplinary hearing.170  The 
district court issued the injunction; URI appealed.171 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals sought to determine whether the 
limited172 use of counsel in this situation was appropriate and necessary to 
 
162. Id. at 104-06. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 104. 
165. 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978). 






172. Id. at 101.  The student requested counsel so that “a lawyer [could] be at his side during 
the hearing for consultation and advice.”  Id.  The student did not request the university allow him 
to use his counsel to participate in the examination of any witnesses.  Id. 
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achieve procedural due process, and therefore, whether the district court 
properly issued the injunction against URI.173  In assessing whether counsel 
would be necessary to ensure sufficient process, the court considered 
whether there was an implication of the Fifth Amendment174 right against 
self-incrimination.175  The court found that the Fifth Amendment was 
implicated.176  The court noted that, in most instances, a student would not 
be deprived of due process in a university disciplinary hearing without the 
assistance of counsel.177  However, the court also distinguished those cases 
which expressly found the right to counsel to be unnecessary in preserving 
a student’s right to due process from Gabrilowitz’s situation.178  The cases 
that found no counsel was necessary to preserve a student’s due process 
rights lacked the “specter of a pending criminal case hovering over the 
hearing.”179  Ultimately, the implication of the Fifth Amendment, the 
possibility of a forced Hobson’s choice without his lawyer,180 and the 
severity of the pending criminal charge181 rendered an advising attorney 
necessary to the preservation of due process in Gabrilowitz’s university 
disciplinary hearing.182  Because of the flexibility inherent in university 
disciplinary hearings,183 most jurisdictions agree that the assistance of an 
attorney is generally not necessary to achieve sufficient process unless there 
is an implication of the Fifth Amendment.184 
 
173. Id. at 101, 104. 
174. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
175. Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 102-07. 
176. Id. at 106. 
177. Id. at 104. 
178. Id.  The court noted that with the exception of two cases, which disallowed students the 
use of an attorney, were also cases where the students were not facing pending criminal trials.  Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.  The Hobson’s choice consisted of remaining at the hearing and facing likely 
expulsion, or speaking without the advice of an attorney and compromising the right against self-
incrimination and jeopardizing the pending criminal trial.  Id. 
181. Id. at 105.  Gabrilowitz faced imprisonment of up to twenty years if found guilty of the 
criminal rape charge he faced.  Id. 
182. Id. at 107. 
183. See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that the 
role of counsel should be limited). 
184. Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).  In this case, the student faced a 
criminal rape charge after local police investigated the incident in question.  Id. at 139.  The 
student’s university charged him with sexual misconduct.  Id. at 140.  The student alleged a viola-
tion of his procedural due process rights because he was not afforded an attorney during the 
hearing, but at the same time, he did not allege that the absence of counsel infringed upon his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Id. at 146.  Accordingly, the court found that with-
out the implication of the Fifth Amendment, the university’s refusal to allow the assistance of an 
attorney did not violate the student’s due process rights in this hearing.  Id. 
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B. ROLE OF COUNSEL 
Once it becomes clear that the charge is serious, there are or likely will 
be pending criminal charges, and the assistance of an attorney is necessary 
to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of the student, a student must also 
explain the role that counsel is to play at the hearing.185  Because the 
assistance of counsel is not required to preserve a student’s due process 
rights in every university disciplinary hearing,186 the courts also consider 
the role that counsel will play at the proceeding.187 
If counsel attends the disciplinary hearing in a watchdog or assistance 
capacity for the purpose of protecting the implicated Fifth Amendment 
rights of the student, then the attorney’s presence and assistance may be a 
necessary element of the proceeding.188  However, the attorney likely will 
not be necessary to preserve the procedural due process rights of the student 
if her presence there is solely because she and her client wish to favorably 
affect the outcome of the university disciplinary hearing itself.189  In 
Donohue, the court explained this distinction by stating, “In view of the 
[self-incrimination] peril faced by the student, . . . a limited role of counsel 
[is] necessary, ‘only to safeguard [the student’s] rights at the hearing, not to 
affect the outcome of the hearing.’”190  The Donohue court further ex-
plained that the role of counsel was not necessary in this case because the 
student intended to use counsel “as a sword”191 to challenge the credibility 
of the witnesses that would be used against him.192  Counsel would have 
been necessary to achieve due process in the hearing only if the student 
used his attorney “as a shield to protect his Fifth Amendment rights.”193  
Donohue suggested that counsel is only necessary in a disciplinary hearing 
when counsel’s role is one in which she serves to protect the student from 
self-incrimination, and not when counsel is present to sway the decision of 
the hearing tribunal.194 
 
185. Id. 
186. Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 107. 
187. Id. at 106. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
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C. DEVIATION FROM INTERNAL PROCEDURES OR ASSURANCES, 
COMPLEXITY OF UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, OR 
PRESENCE OF AN ATTORNEY ON BEHALF OF THE UNIVERSITY 
The final instances in which a university student may invoke the right 
to counsel in a disciplinary hearing arise when: (1) the hearing is governed 
by “complex rules of evidence or procedure;” (2) the university is 
represented by counsel in the disciplinary hearing; or (3) if the university 
deviates from its procedures or assurances and the deviation creates an 
unfairness in and of itself.195 
The courts have been reluctant to describe with much precision what 
constitutes an unfair complexity in university procedure for the purposes of 
due process.196  In Flaim v. Medical College of Ohio,197 Flaim, a medical 
student, was expelled after he was convicted of a felony drug crime while 
attending the institution.198  Following the criminal charge but prior to his 
conviction, the medical college informed Flaim that he was suspended until 
his criminal proceedings were concluded or until he participated in an 
“internal hearing” at the college.199  Flaim decided not to participate in the 
internal hearing until his criminal proceedings were completed.200  Follow-
ing the conclusion of his criminal case, Flaim requested his internal hearing, 
and requested the assistance of counsel at that hearing.201  The college told 
Flaim that he could have an attorney present at the hearing.202  However, 
when the hearing was conducted, the college did not allow Flaim to consult 
with his attorney during the hearing, nor was his attorney allowed to 
actively participate in the hearing.203  Flaim was formally expelled after the 
internal hearing.204  He alleged several due process violations, including an 
infringement of his procedural due process right to counsel.205 
 
195. Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
196. See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a 
medical college’s rules governing a hearing were not overly complex because there were no rules 
of evidence, despite the fact that the plaintiff-student felt deceived when the university allegedly 
departed from its own assurances regarding assistance of counsel during the proceedings). 
197. 418 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005). 
198. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 631-32. 
199. Id. at 632. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 632-33. 
202. Id. at 633. 
203. Id. at 640. 
204. Id. at 633. 
205. Id. at 640. 
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The Sixth Circuit found that Flaim had not suffered a due process 
deprivation due to lack of counsel.206  Because his criminal proceedings had 
already been decided, the Sixth Circuit found that Flaim was not entitled to 
counsel to protect his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.207  
Flaim, however, argued that he had a right to the assistance of counsel 
based on the fact that the college informed him that he could have counsel 
present, and prohibiting him from the assistance of that counsel was 
deceptive and unfair due to the fact that he would have to navigate the 
procedural aspects of the hearing himself.208 
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, stating that even if it were assumed that 
Flaim had been assured that he could have active counsel at the disciplinary 
hearing, not every deviation from the college’s “regulations [or assur-
ances] . . . give[s] rise to a cause of action for violation of constitutional 
rights.”209  The court explained that only when a college or university 
disregards its own regulations or assurances and that disregard “results in a 
procedure which itself impinges upon [a student’s] due process rights” 
should the federal courts intervene in the decisions of state institutions.210  
Further, the Sixth Circuit found that the hearing was not so procedurally 
complex that Flaim was unfairly disadvantaged by the absence of active 
counsel.211  The court agreed that Flaim’s attorney may have been more 
articulate “but there [was] no indication that . . . only a trained attorney 
could have effectively presented his case.”212  Finally, the Sixth Circuit 
hinted that an active attorney for the student may be required to satisfy 
constitutional due process in instances where the college is represented by 
counsel, but, in Flaim’s hearing, the college did not employ counsel on its 
behalf.213 
 
206. Id. at 640-41. 
207. Id. at 640.  The Sixth Circuit explained that “an accused student [possesses] the right to 
counsel only if the student face[s] outstanding criminal charges at the time of the hearing.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. (citing Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1976)) (brackets in 
original). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. The Sixth Circuit did not detail the procedures or rules employed by the university.  
Id.  Rather, the court premised this conclusion on the mere fact that “[t]here were no rules of 
evidence.” Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. (citing Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 
1984)).  But see Saurack, supra note 3, at 821 (stating that even when the university does not 
employ an attorney on its behalf, “the university has a greater familiarity with school procedures” 
which carries with it an unfair advantage when one considers the student’s lack of experience and 
familiarity with the governing procedures). 
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V. OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN ONE’S OWN DEFENSE 
Since Dixon, there has been little or no disagreement concerning the 
idea that a student subjected to the possibility of suspension or expulsion 
must be afforded the opportunity to speak in her own defense at a university 
hearing.214  This part of the note is provided, in part, to help clarify and 
deliver additional information concerning the inherent problem with 
speaking on one’s own behalf and the possibility of self-incrimination 
discussed under Part IV of this note. 
The courts have “uniformly held in student discipline cases that ‘fair 
process requires . . . an opportunity [for the student] to be heard before the 
expulsion or significant suspension’” occurs.215  However, the courts have 
also repeatedly found that a student’s right to be heard in her own defense is 
not as extensive as it might be in a full-scale criminal trial. Yet, this limited 
opportunity to speak in one’s own defense may still be considered sufficient 
process for purposes of a disciplinary hearing.216  The courts decide 
whether this fundamental aspect of due process has been fulfilled by 
determining whether the student “has had an opportunity to answer, 
explain, and defend, and not whether the hearing mirrored a common law 
criminal trial.”217  It is undeniable that the ability to state one’s own version 
of events about the disciplinary matter in question is fundamental to 
achieving sufficient process, but it is possible, if not probable, that a student 
in a disciplinary hearing may be more limited in delivering her defense than 
she would be in an actual judicial setting. 
VI. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES 
In Dixon, the court stated that a university disciplinary hearing could 
not be considered “a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-
examine witnesses” as a requirement in preserving the due process rights of 
the student.218  But the Dixon court also concluded that the students in that 
case should have been given the names of the witnesses against them and an 
oral or written report of the facts to which each witness would testify.219  
More recently, courts have adopted a different view of the necessity of 
 
214. See, e.g., Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (citing Wright, 
supra note 18, at 1071-72) (stating that the student “must be given an opportunity to be heard in 
his own defense”). 
215. Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (N.D. Me. 2002) (quoting Gorman v. 
Univ. R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
216. Id. at 248 (quoting Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13). 
217. Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14. 
218. Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961). 
219. Id. 
      
2006] NOTE 991 
cross-examination in achieving due process in university disciplinary 
hearings.220 
Because “the very nature of due process negates any concept of 
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation,” 
some student disciplinary hearings may require the use of cross-
examination of witnesses.221  In instances where the credibility of witnesses 
is essential to finding a student guilty or innocent of the university’s charge 
and determining the severity of the student’s potential suspension or 
expulsion, cross-examination may be essential in administering a fair 
hearing.222  In these “he-said-she-said” cases, cross-examination may be 
essential to due process because the weight the testimony is given will be 
highly dependent upon the credibility of the individual witness.223  
Statements that will be used as evidence of guilt, which are worth only as 
much as the credibility of the witness delivering them, should be subject to 
cross-examination because the outcome of the hearing rides on the weight 
given to these statements.224 
The other instance in which cross-examination may be necessary 
occurs in cases where effective rebuttal of the evidence, by way of cross-
examination, would affect the severity of the punishment imposed on the 
student.225  In Winnick v. Manning,226 the accused student wished to refute 
the dean’s testimony that characterized the student as the “ringleader” of the 
disruption giving rise to the disciplinary hearing.227  The Second Circuit 
explained that even if the tribunal believed that the student truly was the 
ringleader of the disruptive conduct, and that perception may have been 
disproved through the use of cross-examination, the accused student did not 
receive a heftier penalty than those who were not characterized as “ring-
leaders.”228  Because the use of cross-examination would not have affected 
the student’s punishment, even if he had been able to disprove his role as 
ringleader, “no useful purpose would have been served by permitting 
Winnick to cross-examine Dean Hewes.”229  Therefore, due process did not 
 
220. See, e.g., Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the 
proposition that cross-examination is necessary to achieve fairness in a university disciplinary 
hearing where there are serious issues as to witness credibility). 
221. Id. at 549 (citation omitted). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 550. 
224. Id. at 549. 
225. Id. 
226. 460 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972). 
227. Winnick, 460 F.2d at 549. 
228. Id. 
229. Id.  The critical fact in this case was not what role the student played in the alleged 
misconduct, but rather whether he participated in the alleged misconduct.  Id. at 549-50. 
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require cross-examination of witnesses at the student’s disciplinary 
hearing.230 
Ultimately, whether cross-examination is essential to a fair hearing 
depends on the unique circumstances of each disciplinary hearing.231  If 
cross-examination is required to determine the weight evidence should be 
given based on the credibility of the witnesses, cross-examination is likely 
an essential element of due process.232  If cross-examination would allow 
the student to prove or disprove facts that would affect the severity of her 
punishment, it would likely be instrumental in achieving due process.233  
Without a showing that cross-examination materially affects the weight of 
the evidence, or has great potential to prove or disprove facts that will affect 
the severity of the student’s punishment or the outcome of the hearing 
altogether, cross-examination is probably not a due process requirement in a 
university disciplinary hearing.234 
VII. IMPARTIAL DECISION MAKERS 
“While there remain many vexing questions as to what due process 
requires in school disciplinary proceedings, a fundamental requirement is 
that a hearing must be accorded before an impartial decision maker.”235  
University disciplinary hearings, without a doubt, require that the student 
can plead her story to an unbiased tribunal.236 
In Nash, several students alleged that the university violated their rights 
to due process during their administrative hearings because the university 
failed to provide an impartial hearing body.237  The Eleventh Circuit ex-
plained that “an impartial decision maker [i]s an essential guarantee of due 
process.”238  The students alleged a constitutional due process violation; 
they alleged that they were deprived of an impartial tribunal.239  This allega-
tion arose from the “emotionally charged atmosphere” surrounding the 
supposed academic dishonesty committed by the students before the 
 
230. Id. at 550. 
231. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 663-64 (11th Cir. 1987). 
232. See, e.g., Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Winnick, 
460 F.2d at 550) (“[I]f a case is essentially one of credibility, the ‘cross-examination of witnesses 
might [be] essential to a fair hearing.’”). 
233. Winnick, 460 F.2d at 449-50. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 448. 
236. Winnick, 460 F.2d at 548. 
237. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 665-66 (11th Cir. 1987). 
238. Id. at 665. 
239. Id. 
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hearing was administered.240  The students also alleged the tribunal may not 
have been neutral because, at the hearing, it heard evidence that was both 
irrelevant and highly prejudicial.241  The students further alleged one par-
ticular member of the hearing body lacked impartiality because he failed to 
recuse himself during the hearing; this tribunal member had prior 
knowledge of the charge of academic dishonesty and other alleged facts to 
support the accusations before the administrative hearing was conducted.242 
However, the Nash court concluded that none of these allegations 
provided a legitimate basis upon which to find that the students were 
afforded a less than fair hearing because of a biased tribunal.243  The court 
found that the atmosphere before the hearing, emotionally charged or 
otherwise, was not a problem constituting bias that was captured anywhere 
in the record of the hearing.244  The fact that there may have been some 
controversy on campus surrounding the allegations of academic dishonesty 
was not enough for the court to draw the inference that the tribunal was 
unfairly prejudiced by the controversy.245  The court explained that “[a]ny 
alleged prejudice . . . must be evident from the record and cannot be based 
in speculation or inference.”246  The court further found that no other 
evidence showed that the hearing body made any decisions about the 
students’ guilt before the hearing was completed.247 
The Nash court also dismissed the students’ arguments alleging the 
tribunal’s prejudice because of the admission of irrelevant or highly 
prejudicial evidence as well.248  The court found that the evidentiary rules in 
university disciplinary hearings need not conform to the more rigid and 
formal rules of judicial courtrooms.249  The court stated that the university 
and the hearing body had a great deal of latitude in admitting evidence 
under the flexible framework of due process in this setting, and therefore, 
concluded that the allegedly prejudicial evidence did not affect the ability of 
the tribunal to come to an impartial conclusion.250 
 
240. Id. 
241. Id.  The hearing body was presented with and accepted evidence relating to the 
students’ conduct during prior exams rather than the exam in question.  Id. 
242. Id. at 666. 





248. Id. at 665-66. 
249. Id. at 665.  The court observed that the evidence may have been permissible in a judicial 
proceeding, even with the protections of formal rules of evidence.  Id. 
250. Id. at 665-66. 
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Finally, with respect to the hearing body member who had some 
knowledge of the charges and allegations before the hearing but did not 
recuse himself, the Eleventh Circuit found that the record did not 
demonstrate any prejudice on his part.251  The court also explained that it 
had already “refused ‘to establish a per se rule that would disqualify 
administrative hearing bodies . . . solely for the reason that . . . some of [the 
members] participated in the initial investigation of the incident and 
initiation of the cause under consideration.”252  Allegations that the hearing 
body member was involved in the investigation, had prior knowledge of the 
charges, and had possibly been privy to some of the evidence were not 
enough for the Nash court to find prejudice and lack of sufficient process.253 
Other courts, however, have been more concerned with the impartiality 
issue.  For instance, in Center for Participant Education v. Marshall,254 a 
federal district court left some room to contest the impartiality of a 
tribunal.255  When allegations of prejudice and fundamental unfairness were 
premised on the school’s seemingly conflicting roles as both prosecutor and 
adjudicator, the court stated that unfairness was not evident “in the absence 
of a showing of other circumstances such as malice or personal interest in 
the outcome of the case.”256  While the court found that the tribunal was not 
biased in this case, it acknowledged that there was certainly the potential for 
instances in which malice or personal stake could create a serious bias in 
the tribunal, and therefore, the hearing would fail to provide sufficient 
process. 
In Winnick, the Second Circuit also suggested that some solid evidence, 
beyond mere employment or administrative capacity within the university, 
must be introduced to show bias on the part of the hearing body or one of 
its members.257  There would have to be evidence demonstrating that the 
tribunal member was incapable of impartial application of rules and 
regulations governing the hearing,258 or that the member “observed, 
investigated, or made [some] prehearing decisions” about the accused.259  
Thus, if a student can demonstrate that the tribunal member participated in 
much of the investigation leading up to the hearing, or that the tribunal 
 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 666 (citing Duke v. N. Tex. State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 834 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
253. Id. 
254. 337 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Fla. 1972). 
255. Ctr. for Participant Educ., 337 F. Supp. at 135. 
256. Id. (quoting Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968)). 
257. Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1972). 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
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member unfairly administered the university’s rules and regulations 
governing the hearing, a court may very well find that a due process 
violation occurred. 
The mere allegation of impropriety based on the position of the  
tribunal member with respect to the university, or even the fact that the 
adjudicator might also be the prosecutor, is not by itself enough to reach the 
conclusion that a university disciplinary hearing lacked impartiality.260  
Further, without some record or evidence of actual prejudice, malice, or 
personal interest, a tribunal member may be allowed, at least to some 
degree, to investigate the alleged events giving rise to the hearing and 
initiate the hearing process; arguably, the hearing body is still impartial so 
long as that decision maker does not come to any conclusions about the 
guilt or innocence of the accused student before the disciplinary hearing is 
completed.261 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Constitution or no, it is hardly thinkable that we would deny to today’s 
generation of students . . . procedural fairness.262 
 
In the forty-five years following the student-friendly landmark decision 
in Dixon, the hypothetical student discussed in the introduction, and many 
in the real world, should relax a bit about the over-bearing, parent-like 
universities of the past as they stroll through their campus days.263  Or 
should they?264 
Although the courts have made great strides in the quest to treat 
university students like other adults who have certain constitutionally 
protected rights or interests, it still seems as though there are several issues 
that might make a student’s skin crawl in a university disciplinary hearing.  




262. Wright, supra note 18, at 1086. 
263. See, e.g., Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (explaining 
that students in contemporary academic disciplinary settings are afforded far greater rights than 
students of the past because the formerly “authoritarian” nature of universities has been “diluted” 
to a large degree at present). 
264. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that the 
assistance of counsel may only be a fundamental aspect of due process if there is a pending 
criminal charge, the implication of the Fifth Amendment, or serious issues as to the credibility of 
witnesses). 
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protect students against procedures that are “unwise,” “floor-level,” or 
“minimal.” 265 
At present, the only protections that students must be afforded in every 
serious university disciplinary hearing are: notice, a hearing, a finding of 
guilt based only on substantial evidence, and written findings and record of 
the proceeding.266  There is still disagreement as to whether an attorney 
should be afforded to students, and, if an attorney is provided, there are 
questions as to the scope of the role that attorney may assume.267  Cross-
examination may also be limited depending on the particular circumstances 
of each case.268 
The United States Supreme Court stated in 1943 that “[t]he history of 
liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safe-
guards.”269  Yet, while there is a recognition that “the risk of error [in these 
proceedings] is not at all trivial,” contemporary courts will affirm suspen-
sions and expulsions from universities that employ procedures which are 
“far from ideal” or meet only “the lowest level” of fairness acceptable under 
the Due Process Clause.270  It is encouraging that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has become more protective of the rights of post-secondary students 
over the last several decades, but still very troubling that students are only 
entitled to the most rudimentary levels of fairness acceptable under the 
Constitution. 
Elizabeth Ledgerwood Pendlay∗ 
 
265. See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing 
between disciplinary procedures that are “wise” but not “constitutionally required” because the 
Due Process Clause sets only “the floor or lowest level of procedures acceptable”). 
266. See Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970)  (listing the minimum 
requirements to achieve due process in a university disciplinary hearing).  But see Flaim, 418 F.3d 
at 636 (finding that even a record of the proceeding may not be constitutionally required in all 
university disciplinary cases). 
267. See supra note 160. 
268. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 663-65 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing the 
situations in which due process may or may not require an opportunity for the students to cross-
examine witnesses.) 
269. McNabb v. Unites States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). 
270. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 636, 642. 
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